Three Victories and a Defeat

November 3, 2008
Simms, of Cambridge University, is among the finest of a new generation of British historians. In his most ambitious work to date, he addresses arguably the fundamental question of British identity: is it European or insular? Simms lines up solidly with the Europeanists, but provides a global twist. He interprets Britain's greatness and survival as a function of maintaining a buffer zone on the continent. The Low Countries and the Holy Roman Empire had to remain in friendly hands. In the first half of the 18th century, Britain, as a burgeoning empire, sought allies with economic resources and, when necessary, with armed force. The result was “three victories”—against Spain, Austria and in the Seven Years' War—that established a balance of power. Yet Britain's government and people began to believe the sea and the Royal Navy alone guaranteed Britain's security. Neglecting and alienating its continental neighbors led to the expansion of a debate with the North American colonies into a global war. Britain suffered disaster, but learned a lesson as well, Simms shows, maintaining in succeeding centuries the continental commitment that sustained its existence. Illus., maps.

February 1, 2009
Britain's empire and security, according to Simms (European International Relations, Univ. of Cambridge; "Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia"), were not so much the results of its vaunted and storied navy, but were, rather, the consequences of its many canny alliances on the continent. To forestall the always anticipated attack by France, Britain's Hanoverian kings cloaked their nation with an ever-shifting canopy of ententes, sometimes with the Dutch, sometimes the Russians, but always with someone who had an interest in containing the dreaded Bourbons. The defeat of Britain by its American colonies marked the end of that phase of British history as well as a definite downturn in the empire's fortunes. Yet again, the continent had played a pivotal role in deciding England's fate. Britain simply could not defend itself from the east while attacking to the west, and the colonists knew it. Simms has created a prolifically annotated and vividly detailed recounting of the 18th-century watershed that temporarily sundered the British Empire. Profoundly scholarly, yet still accessible to the nonscholar, it is recommended for academic and public libraries.Michael F. Russo, Louisiana State Univ. Libs., Baton Rouge, LA

Copyright 2009 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

January 1, 2009
Simms is a professor of history at Cambridge University, and the empire he refers to is the extension of British control and influence from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century into North America and the fringes of the European mainland. He distinguishes this from the so-called Victorian empire, which spread across Africa and Asia in the nineteenth century. But this extension, Simms asserts, was motivated less by imperial dreams than it was by British efforts to defend interests in continental Europe. Here, Simms is going against the grain. Conventional historical accounts usually stress the unique position of Britain as an island nation protected by the Royal Navy. Simms maintains that eighteenth-century Britain was politically, socially, and economically part of Europe and the European state system. The English Channel was a bridge, not a moat. Britains particular interest was to defend economic ties with the Low Countries, and British politicians saw powerful German states as threatening those links. This is an interesting and often provocative revisionist work.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2009, American Library Association.)