Gambling with Armageddon

July 1, 2020
A fresh examination of the Cuban missile crisis and its wider historical context, showing how the U.S. avoided nuclear war. As Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Sherwin writes, it wasn't due to wise national leadership. In 1945, dazzled at being sole possessor of the atomic bomb, American leaders debated its role. According to the author, Harry Truman and his advisers concluded that it was the key to containing Stalin. But Stalin was not cowed, and the confrontation evolved into the Cold War. Matters came to a head in 1959, when Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba's dictator, obsessing the Eisenhower administration during its last year and Kennedy's throughout. After taking office, Kennedy learned that U.S.-recruited anti-Castro Cubans were training to invade Cuba. To his everlasting regret, he assumed that officials in charge knew what they were doing. When the invasion was clearly failing, advisers expected Kennedy to send in American troops to prevent an international humiliation. That Kennedy chose humiliation was a mark of statesmanship but also a painful lesson about trusting experts. Castro and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev assumed that America would try again, and, angered by U.S. missiles in nearby Turkey, Khrushchev decided that putting missiles in Cuba would balance matters. Sherwin comprehensively recounts events during October 1962, after U.S. reconnaissance discovered the missiles. Everyone, Kennedy included, assumed that this meant war. American nuclear forces were alerted, and two decisions to launch were averted at the last moment. The first to propose negotiation was U.N. ambassador Adlai Stevenson. More than most scholars--and Kennedy himself--Sherwin gives Stevenson credit for planting the idea. Most readers know that, in the end, Khrushchev withdrew the missiles, and the U.S. removed theirs from Turkey. Sherwin's detailed, opinionated scholarship makes it clear how national leaders bumbled through the crisis, avoiding nuclear Armageddon through modest amounts of wisdom mixed with plenty of machismo, delusions, and serendipity. Future crises are inevitable, and the author clearly demonstrates how there are no guarantees they will turn out so well. A fearfully convincing case that avoiding nuclear war "is contingent on the world's dwindling reservoir of good luck."

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Starred review from July 6, 2020
Blunders, misunderstandings, and “dumb luck” shape history in this captivating reevaluation of post-WWII nuclear brinksmanship. Examining America’s use of atomic weaponry to contain Soviet expansion in Asia and the Americas, Pulitzer winner Sherwin (coauthor, American Prometheus) relates in nerve-jangling detail how presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy grappled with their Soviet counterparts, Stalin and Khrushchev. According to Sherwin’s portrayal, Truman was “intellectually and emotionally unprepared” to understand the atomic high stakes and often deferred to his hawkish secretary of state, James F. Byrnes. Entangled in an affair with a White House intern, Kennedy wavered during the Cuban Missile Crisis and depended on his brother, Robert, to back-channel with the Soviets to avoid nuclear war. According to Sherwin, military personnel countermanded orders to launch nuclear weapons on multiple occasions during the two-week confrontation. In one instance, a U.S. missile squadron on Okinawa was poised to fire 32 nuclear missiles at targets in China and the Soviet Union before deciding to stand down. Intricately detailed, vividly written, and nearly Tolstoyan in scope, Sherwin’s account reveals just how close the Cold War came to boiling over. History buffs will be enthralled.

Starred review from August 1, 2020
Sherwin, coauthor (with Kai Bird) of the Pulitzer-winning biography of J. Robert Oppenheimer, American Prometheus (2005), here examines nuclear policy as it evolved in the Cold War, culminating with the chillingly suspenseful, weeklong drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Taking a somewhat contrarian approach, he views the missile crisis as a direct consequence of the nuclear-arms race and the keystone event in the Cold War. Grounded in an exceptional and up-to-date knowledge of the military, diplomatic, and individual components of American and Soviet politics, he speculates on the role played by chance and even dumb luck in the high-level chess game that was played out in October 1962, deftly summarizing the positions of those favoring an immediate military strike at the Russian missiles in Cuba, as opposed to less cataclysmic actions (resulting, opponents argued, in a Soviet takeover of Berlin). Despite the Kennedy brothers' contempt for Adlai Stevenson, Sherwin shows how our U.N. ambassador expressed a sober and rational voice countering the (many) hawks during the tense discussions. Pair this insightful look at Cold War history with Fred Kaplan's laser-sharp analysis of American nuclear strategy in The Bomb (2020).(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2020, American Library Association.)

Starred review from September 1, 2020

Pulitzer Prize winner Sherwin (history, George Mason Univ.; with Kai Bird, American Prometheus) served as an intelligence naval officer during the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 16-28, 1962. This deeply researched account has a you-are-there feel, as he discusses the harrowing 13 days when world devastation was only a mistake away. Earlier accounts and TV dramas frequently portray the crisis as an endgame between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Sherwin dispels this simplistic interpretation by placing the crisis in its Cold War context, identifying its roots within the anti-Soviet and massive retaliation polices of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The book reveals West Berlin's importance to Kennedy and Khrushchev, identifies the roles played by National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, and UN Secretary-General U Thant. Additionally, Sherwin deftly shows how war was almost precipitated by a junior United States officer and avoided by a Soviet officer. Politician and diplomat Adlai Stevenson, the unsung hero, resolutely called for the blockade strategy ultimately adopted by Kennedy. VERDICT This important investigation of a significant Cold War event will inform and engross modern history readers.--Karl Helicher, formerly with Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA

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