While America Sleeps

September 4, 2000
Father Donald (The Western Heritage) and son Frederick, professors of history at Yale and West Point respectively, have combined their talents to produce a frightening story of close parallels between Great Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and America in the 1990s. After 1918, Britain slashed its armed forces and defined its interests in the context of international organizations and agreements. The result, contend the Kagans, was a foreign policy of "pseudo-engagement"--rhetoric unaccompanied by the effective use of force--that steadily undermined Britain's credibility. In a series of chapters written in acid, the Kagans argue that the U.S. has set itself up for a similar fall by diminishing its military capacities in pursuit of an ephemeral "peace dividend" and by overextending its armed forces in pursuit of poorly defined responsibilities--Iraq, the Balkans, North Korea. The Kagans suggest that the U.S. now stands about where Britain did at the end of the 1920s--somewhere on the bubble: in a position to restore the balance between military power and international responsibility, but facing strong temptations to procrastinate and deny. (It was 1938, the Kagans point out, before the British government faced squarely the consequences of its relative disarmament.) Readers may not agree with the Kagans' analysis of the synergy between military power and national policy, but they will be impressed by the force of their argument and the power of their reasoning.

October 1, 2000
Donald Kagan (history and classics, Yale Univ.; Western Heritage) and Frederick Kagan (history, U.S. Military Academy; The Military Reforms of Nicholas I) note several similarities between pre-World War II Britain and America in the wake of the Cold War. More or less victorious in a recent war, each appeared to have lost the commitment to continue as a world leader. Historians may remember Winston Churchill's 1938 While England Slept: A Survey of World Affairs or JFK's 1940 Why England Slept, both of which discussed British lack of preparation during the interwar years. Can a valid parallel be drawn between 1930s Britain and the contemporary United States? Readers and policymakers will have to decide. This thoroughly researched and extensively noted book will likely appeal to historians or period specialists; the casual reader will probably lose interest with the meticulous research. Recommended for academic libraries or public libraries with a good history and foreign policy section.--Mark Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA

Copyright 2000 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

September 1, 2000
Donald Kagan is professor of history and classics at Yale University. His son, Frederick, is a professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy. Together they promote the alarming if debatable thesis that a general war with a world (rather than regional) power such as Russia or China is still a realistic possibility. Conversely, they reject the prevailing wisdom that for the foreseeable future, American wars are likely to be small-scale conflicts in which American technological advantages will ensure a quick, "painless" victory. Based on those suppositions, they find\plain\f2\fs24\b \plain\f2\fs24 the U.S. military dangerously unprepared, as planners have neglected manpower needs while overrelying on "smart" weapons. To support their views, the Kagans draw comparisons with British military policies between the world wars. Although some of these comparisons seem strained, others ring disturbingly true. And although some of the fears expressed here may seem far-fetched, this challenge to some of the basic assumptions about our role in the post-cold war world deserves serious consideration. (Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2000, American Library Association.)