Dixie Betrayed

February 27, 2006
Eicher follows up his impressive Civil War military history, 2002's The Longest Night, with this dynamic, if frustrating, history that begs the question of whether the Confederacy would have remained a unified nation if the South had won. As Eicher notes, the South was undermined by its paradoxical efforts to fight a war and retain state rights. Derision began immediately, as governors from Georgia and Texas wanted to control their own militias, and politicians from Virginia resented president Jefferson Davis's plan to construct a railroad within their state. Arguments erupted over conscription acts, military assignments and the limits of presidential power. Although Davis was a victim of a subversive Congress, he brought on much of the enmity by micromanaging the war effort, appointing an inexperienced war secretary, placing friends in positions of authority and doggedly guarding his power. By the end of the war, frustration over the constant arguing manifested itself in cunning acts of betrayal: vice president Alexander Stephens and a newspaper editor bought a newspaper to use as a conduit for airing their discontent. Another nemesis was arrested while on his way to Washington on an unauthorized peace mission. If Eicher's narrative chases its tail, it's because the South's leaders quarreled repeatedly over the same issues, though Eicher keeps the repetitive story lively through his nimble storytelling.

February 15, 2006
Eicher ("The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War") turns to the personalities and politics of the Confederate government to explore and explain the South -s failure to win its independence. He follows a long trail of historians who argue that Dixie died from states - rights. Because the Confederacy lacked a strong central government, owing to politicians who placed states - rights above all else, and was not overseen by effective leadership that could convey a compelling national identity, it was not capable of survival. Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America, battled with his generals and the Confederate Congress over appointments, conscription, the use (and even arming) of slaves in the war effort, presidential authority, and peace initiatives. While Southerners developed a deep commitment to the "idea" of a Southern nation, they lacked the will and means to achieve it. Eicher insists that Jefferson Davis is largely responsible for these circumstances. Students of the Confederacy and the Civil War will appreciate Eicher -s vignettes of secessionists, generals, and Confederate cabinet officers, but they will not find much new here in information or argument. Recommended only for university and public libraries wanting comprehensive Civil War holdings." -Randall M. Miller, Saint Joseph -s Univ., Philadelphia"

Copyright 2006 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

February 1, 2006
Much ink has been spilled debating the question of why the South lost the Civil War. Eicher offers his own significant analysis of what he views as the central issue: how the Confederacy shot itself in the foot because its leaders "together . . . founded an imperfect union, and together they destroyed it." How was a nation built primarily on the concept of states' rights ever going to create for itself sufficient unity of effort to win a war the very purpose of which, from the Union perspective, was to ensure the preservation of the Union those states had pulled out of? With great difficulty, of course, and this author sees that the problem for the South was never solved. President Jefferson Davis bickered with the Confederate Congress, the state governors bickered with him, the military also bickered with Congress, and Davis attempted to micromanage the whole enterprise; thus, Eicher considers the project doomed to failure from the moment of its inception. "The Confederacy," he insists, and building a strong case for his position, "was born sick."(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2006, American Library Association.)