Black April

January 9, 2012
In the first of a projected two volumes, Veith (Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War) provides “a comprehensive analysis of the finale of America’s first lost war.” That analysis mainly consists of a thorough recounting of the military action that took place after the United States withdrew its last combat troops in March 1973. He combed through official American sources as well as North Vietnamese material, including unit histories, battle studies, and memoirs that he translated into English for the first time. He also mined primary source material from South Vietnam, and conducted dozens of interviews. The result is a detailed account, heavy on descriptions of battlefield tactics of both sides. As for his political analysis, Veith contends—contrary to the prevailing wisdom—that the South Vietnamese in general fought well, and that the U.S. was primarily responsible for their defeat: due to “congressional restraints on aid” to South Vietnam, American “anti-war crusaders,” and “major media institutions,” as well as North Vietnamese perfidy and South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Van Thieu’s “military blunders.” This will appeal to readers who want military details of the conclusion of the Vietnam War, as well as those who share Veith’s anticommunism.

March 1, 2012
The indelible images of the final U.S. failure in Vietnam include North Vietnamese tanks smashing into government compounds and the mad rush to board helicopters leaving our embassy. The Vietnam War was, of course, our tragedy, but this brilliant work reminds us that it was also a tragedy for millions of our South Vietnamese allies. This is the first volume of an anticipated two-volume history of the final years of the war, from the 1973 Paris Peace Accords to the 1975 surrender of South Vietnam. Veith's primary focus is the performance of the South Vietnamese army, with particular attention paid to the rapid collapse of that army preceding the surrender. Utilizing a variety of newly available source materials, including primary ones from North Vietnam, Veith contradicts the conventional portrait of the South Vietnamese army as unmotivated, poorly led, and hopelessly corrupt. He convincingly asserts that many officers and ordinary soldiers were both brave and effective soldiers, so Veith concentrates on other factors. This is an outstanding reexamination of a frequently neglected aspect of the war.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2012, American Library Association.)