1939

July 19, 2010
In this short book, stating that "nothing in history is inevitable," University of Essex professor Overy (Why the Allies Won) strives to explain what led to the outbreak of WWII after years of tension and appeasement. He focuses on the diplomatic maneuvering during "the extraordinary ten days of drama," August 24 to September 3, 1939, demonstrating that diplomats in London, Paris, and Berlin wanted to avoid a world war. But Overy traces the events and decisions that moved the two allies, sworn to defend Polish independence, from efforts at deterrence to a willingness to fight after Hitler invaded Poland. Overy is best in portraying the diplomatic wrangling, taking readers inside an explosive meeting between Neville Henderson, Britain's ambassador to Berlin, and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. He also uncovers some surprising facts, such as France's last-minute wavering in confronting Hitler and that the Nazi leader, in exchange for Britain acquiescing in his Polish takeover, promised to guarantee the British empire. The last-minute diplomacy Overy describes is fascinating, but there is too little political, military, and sociocultural background to provide context for readers unfamiliar with the period.

August 1, 2010

Overy (History/Univ. of Exeter; The Twilight Years: The Paradox of Britain Between the Wars, 2009, etc.) limns the annus horribilis in which World War II broke out in Europe.

By the author's account, the war was inevitable. Europe had nearly disintegrated into chaos, marked by "economic crisis, the rise of authoritarian dictatorships, deep ideological divisions, nationalist rivalries, and the collapse of the effort of the League of Nations to preserve peace." All of these elements virtually guaranteed conflict, though the so-called Polish question was the single great catalyst. After World War I, the Allies had both created an independent Polish state and carved access to the Baltic Sea for it out of German territory, another sure way to cause strife, especially since Germany never recognized many of the provisions even before Hitler's time. Yet it was Hitler who added the missing ingredient of revanchism, while his erstwhile treaty partner Joseph Stalin labored diligently to secure Soviet neutrality in the hope of winning some measure of control over Eastern Europe. As Overy writes, the Soviets were masterful in playing the Western Allies against Germany to gain concessions from both sides. Neither Germany nor Russia "regarded Poland as a permanent political fixture," so dividing it up was troublesome to neither party and indeed was "an acceptable outcome to both sides." The author gives Neville Chamberlain a slight rehabilitation, noting that by 1939 he had no illusions about Hitler or his intentions, and adding that very few ordinary Europeans actually wanted war. Yet in the end war was the only possible result of a great chess game in which Hitler played an Italian card even as Italy scrambled to maintain neutrality on its own, betting as well that England and France would not rescue Poland. That they did, the author concludes, was "not to save Poland from a cruel occupation but to save [them] from the dangers of a disintegrating world."

Inevitable? Perhaps not, but the events of 1939 made the war "hard to avoid." Lucid and to the point, as is Overy's custom—of much value to students of the political dimensions of WWII.

(COPYRIGHT (2010) KIRKUS REVIEWS/NIELSEN BUSINESS MEDIA, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.)

September 1, 2010

The origins of World War II have probably not received the level of attention devoted to the century's earlier major conflict. In this slim volume, Overy (history, Univ. of Exeter; The Twilight Years: The Paradox of Britain Between the Wars) provides a straightforward examination of those last days in late August and early September 1939 when the peaceful European countryside was about to be shattered by a new world war. Hitler had originally wanted to attack Poland on August 26 but changed his mind. The following days were filled with hectic communications (and miscommunications) among Berlin, Paris, and London. The nerves of all the participants were shot by late August. Meanwhile, Hitler made up his mind again to start war mobilization with the attack on Poland scheduled for early morning on September 1. Overy believes that Hitler misjudged his Western counterparts because the German dictator was convinced that neither France nor Britain would do anything once the attack had begun. For that error in judgment, Europe and much of the rest of the world was convulsed in another terrible war for nearly six years. VERDICT Overy's well-crafted and easy-to-read book should be a useful source for both general and academic readers.--Ed Goedeken, Iowa State Univ. Lib., Ames

Copyright 2010 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

August 1, 2010
Given the personality and ambitions of Hitler and the ideological nature of the Nazi regime, the outbreak of WWII in Europe is often seen as inevitable after the betrayal of the Czechs at Munich. Professor Overy doesnt dispute the idea that, in the long term, military opposition to Hitler had to happen. However, the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939; the subsequent declaration of war by Britain and France; and the short-term military aspects of the conflict were the consequences of a series of decisions made by a small number of men during the months preceding the outbreak of war. Of course, we know how the story ends, but Overy effectively utilizes primary sources to build up dramatic tension as the clock ticks down. Some of his assertions and conclusions go against the grain and should generate controversy. Chamberlain, while not a a tower of strength, had no illusions concerning Hitlers ultimate aims. The Poles may have hastened the outbreak of war by refusing to compromise over the city of Danzig. Hitler correctly anticipated a short war against Poland but neither sought nor expected a wider war. This is an interesting and often provocative description of Europe descending into an abyss.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2010, American Library Association.)