The Third Wittgenstein

This sustained examination shows that the third Wittgenstein breaks new ground with insights unprecedented in both his own work and philosophy more broadly, giving us keys to the solution and dissolution of problems that have plagued philosophy since Descartes, such as philosophical scepticism and the mind-body problem. Wittgenstein's ultimate and revised positions with regard to epistemology, foundationalism, 'grammar', naturalism, the psychology of language, and psychological indeterminacy are clearly delineated. This book also provides new and illuminating accounts of difficult concepts, such as patterns of life, experiencing meaning, meaning blindness, lying and pretence.

Contents: Introduction: The idea of a third Wittgenstein, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Wittgenstein's foundational metaphors, Avrum Stroll
Two Wittgensteins too many: Wittgenstein's foundationalism, Dan Hutto
On Certainty and the grammaticalisation of experience, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Knowledge, certainty and scepticism: in Moore's defence, Hans-Johann Glock
Wittgenstein's social naturalism: the idea of 'second nature' after the Philosophical Investigations, José Medina
Wittgenstein and epistemology, John Koethe
What does 'experiencing meaning' mean?, Laurence Goldstein
'Patterns of life': a third Wittgenstein concept, Michel ter Hark
Pretence and the inner, John V. Canfield
Wittgenstein on lying as a language game, Dale Jacquette
Wittgenstein's answer to 'What is Colour?', Jacques Bouveresse
Wittgenstein and the riddle of life, Frank Cioffi
Bibliography
Index.