The Bombers and the Bombed

November 25, 2013
WWII scholar Overy (The Twilight Years) brings his expertise in aerial operations to this first comprehensive analysis of the Allied strategic bombing offensive in Europe. He addresses the subject from three interrelated perspectives: the planning and execution of the air campaign; the Axis responses; and the oft-overlooked experiences of those under Axis occupation who were “bombed into freedom.” Overy acknowledges that until mid-1944, an air offensive was the Western Allies’ only feasible way of attacking Germany directly, yet the raids’ limited success initially led some to question whether “bombing by itself” could be decisive in the war. Insistence that it “would shorten the war,” combined with the belief that daylight precision bombardment would “completely... dislocate German industry and communications,” led to an attrition campaign against the world’s most sophisticated defenses. It produced marginal results until the Americans concentrated on the aircraft industry, and on oil production and delivery. Overy’s model analysis of “German Society under the Bombs” reveals how the Reich’s economy and morale withstood the bomber offensive, though elsewhere in Germany’s New Order, as military considerations obscured political ones, bombing became “more vigorous and less discriminate.” Postwar reconstruction correspondingly resembled “recovery from a natural disaster”—which the bomber offensive closely resembled. Agent: Gill Coleridge; Rogers, Coleridge & White (U.K.).

December 15, 2013
Historians still argue over how much, if at all, strategic bombing contributed to defeating Hitler. This magisterial overview will not end the debate, but it skillfully illuminates all sides. Demonstrating his exhaustive research, Overy (History/Univ. of Exeter; 1939: Countdown to War, 2011) begins the first chapter, "Bombing Bulgaria," with a description of a destructive campaign that undermined the pro-German government, which managed to persist until the Soviet army arrived. Few readers will ignore the lesson. Throughout World War II, British Bomber command believed that it could devastate the war-making capacities of the Nazis. Within months, losses forced a switch to nighttime bombing, which made accuracy nearly impossible. Overy delivers an insightful analysis of how all nations reversed their abhorrence of killing civilians when it became unavoidable. The British were not taking revenge for the Blitz; their conversion had already occurred. The United States assumed its more heavily armed bombers (with lesser payloads) could defend themselves during the day and hit targets precisely. Both beliefs proved wrong, but America stuck to daylight bombing despite terrible losses. Both nations exaggerated the damage that their bombers caused, but good evidence exists that a major effort against Nazi oil production caused crippling shortages during 1944 and 1945. Overy provides an eye-opening and often distressing account of the bombing of Europe's occupied nations, whose defenses were far less prepared than Germany's. More bombs fell on France and Italy than England. "The moral response to bombing and being bombed was historically complex and sometimes surprising," writes the author. Readers looking for dramatic accounts of specific bombing missions should read a selection of books by British military historian Martin Middlebrook. For a far more expansive view that includes those on the receiving end, Overy is the choice.

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January 1, 2014
The air war over Europe in WWII is estimated to have killed 600,000 civilians. Some of these deaths were, in today's terms, collateral damage from attacks on military or industrial targets. But many deaths were the result of deliberate terror bombings in an effort to destroy houses of workers and to demoralize the population. The question posed by British history professor Overy in this superb work is, Was it worth it? Surprisingly, he doesn't spend much time on the morality of bombing, although his descriptions of the horrible suffering of civilian populations are certainly startling. Rather, he relies on a massive trove of primary sources from both Allied and Axis sources to assert that the various bombing campaigns were a waste of military resources. Despite claims of success by the military, aerial bombing was ridiculously inaccurate, and the casualty rate for air crews was very high. The attacks tended to unite rather than demoralize civilians. There is, of course, another side to this question, but Overy has presented a very strong case in support of his view.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2014, American Library Association.)

September 1, 2013

Overy, a University of Exeter history professor who specializes in World War II, here offers up some controversy. Documenting the extent to which Britain and the United States bombed German-occupied Europe, he asks us to ponder the morality of the Allies' "moral war."

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