Why We Lost

September 29, 2014
Despite this book’s subtitle, this is not a first-person narrative detailing exactly how Bolger, who retired in 2013 as a lieutenant general, played a part in America’s post-9/11 military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Apart from a frank author’s note, which opens with Bolger admitting, hyperbolically, that he “lost the Global War on Terrorism,” the work presents an outside view of events, and Bolger doesn’t say which specific decisions and battles he was party to. The opening section notes that “there’s enough fault to go around, and in this telling, the suits will get their share. But I know better, and so do the rest of the generals.... This was our war to lose, and we did.” That provocative stance, which runs counter to the conventional wisdom (that the Pentagon and White House, for instance, made poor political decisions), would be more persuasive had Bolger provided his eyewitness basis for it. On a different note, what feels like a strained effort to be hip undercuts the essential grimness of the books. Apart from these downsides, Bolger offers a comprehensive look at how these wars were fought during his tenure, which for some readers could be a useful introduction to the conflicts. Maps & 16p color insert.

June 1, 2014

Bolger recently completed 35 years in the U.S. Army, retiring in 2013 as a lieutenant general; he served as a commander in both Iraq and Afghanistan, carrying a rifle alongside his troops. Here he puts himself on the line again by arguing that we actually lost the campaigns in both countries--and that these losses weren't necessary. Blaming generals like himself, he highlights poor intelligence, overreliance on theory or ideology, and a failure to understand the enemy for what he sees as a hugely missed opportunity. Obviously, a book that will provoke discussion; with a 75,000-copy first printing.

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