The Future of War

Starred review from August 15, 2017
Nations are constantly preparing for war, and a major part of that preparation is predicting what the next war will be like. An expert in military strategy provides a detailed look at how that process has evolved.Freedman (Emeritus, War Studies/Kings Coll. London; Strategy: A History, 2013, etc.) focuses primarily on British and American approaches, beginning in the mid-19th century, when a consensus arose that wars were decided in decisive battle, on the model of Waterloo. This encouraged military planners to aim for a knockout blow, preferably at the beginning of hostilities. Despite ample evidence of its flaws, this doctrine held sway for more than a century. With the arrival of the Cold War and its persistent theme of nuclear stalemate, Great Power wars became unthinkable. New technology that would avoid nuclear involvement became the holy grail of military thinkers. Then, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, local civil wars began to dominate the landscape. Western involvement--e.g., in Kosovo--became common, with results that often disappointed. Especially after 9/11, it became clear that traditional military methods were inadequate to win the new kind of conflict. The importance of cyberwar and the introduction of remote ways of killing--drones, in particular--came to the forefront, while grinding civil wars and terrorist action dominated the landscape. To show how contemporaries viewed future war in various eras, Freedman cites novels such as H.G. Wells' War of the Worlds and Nevil Shute's On the Beach along with more official military texts to show how the brass was thinking. More often than not, everybody guessed wrong, especially as they fell under the "decisive battle" illusion. Freedman consistently brings the discussion down to real cases, covering a wide range of history and geography. The final section, which considers the place of gang warfare and civil unrest in many parts of the world and the likely role of China in future conflicts, is especially thought-provoking. The author's lively style adds to the interest for general readers. A valuable book for anyone interested in international affairs.

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September 15, 2017

For those who favor simple answers to complex issues, this work by Freedman (emeritus professor, war studies, King's Coll. London; Strategy: A History) comes as a historic warning that there are none. Here, the author focuses on government predictions before, during, and after military conflicts; when diplomacy ends the politics of war begins and opposition is a consistent factor. Freedman surveys international conflicts and their predicted outcomes, those both "scientific" and normative, as well as those speculated by others such as novelists. The narrative spans the end of the 19th through the 20th century, from colonial wars to both World Wars, the Cold War, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. The author makes a convincing case that the military, defense industries, government think tanks, academia, politicians, and the media are not much better than creators of fiction when it comes to predictions of future war. VERDICT Although a sometimes monotonous read, Freedman's latest work delivers an important message. It will most appeal to military historians and political scientists.--William D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport

Copyright 2017 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

January 1, 2018
Freedman (Strategy), professor emeritus of war studies at King’s College London, takes aim at how generations of historians, military analysts, politicians, and journalists have tried to anticipate the unknowable: the contours of the next major conflict involving political superpowers or regional actors. In the annals of crystal ball gazing, Freedman points out, most soothsayers have been way off. Prior to WWI, instead of massive armies coming to blows, European nations engaged in colonial exploits in undeveloped lands. Some asserted that growing economic prosperity meant that countries would have little need to fight over resources. But after WWII, an apocalyptic view of future warfare took hold; the development of nuclear weapons merely dialed up this tendency, even as some parties asserted that the bombs would serve as deterrents. More recently, 21st-century prognosticators are predicting cyberwar; robot and drone fighting forces; potential clashes between the U.S., China, or Russia; and conflicts sparked by climate change–fueled events such as drought and famine. As chroniclers catalog the myriad ways that the next war could explode, Freedman unsurprisingly concludes that war “has a future.” Freedman’s work makes for well-informed, if dire, reading, and the book’s audience is probably limited to hardcore conflict enthusiasts.