Reckless

July 1, 2018
A historian specializing in American foreign policy mines newly available archives to expose Henry Kissinger as a lying, self-serving, and incompetent presidential adviser who collaborated with Richard Nixon to allow the North Vietnamese victory against the American-backed South Vietnamese.Although countless words have been published about the Vietnam War, Brigham (History and International Relations/Vassar Coll.; The United States and Iraq Since 1990: A Brief History with Documents, 2013, etc.) explains that his book is the first to use certain material from Kissinger's papers housed at Yale University, the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, and "South Vietnamese sources contained in the National Archives in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam." As Brigham evaluated the fresh material, he compared it to Kissinger's publicly stated definition of American "success" in Vietnam. The touchstone of Kissinger's definition could be stated as "peace with honor" before the U.S. military withdrew troops; he had hoped to achieve peace with honor tactically by waging "war for peace." In section after section throughout the book, Brigham quotes from specific Kissinger documents and then comments on how and why Kissinger's tactics failed. The evidence builds chronologically as each of the lengthy chapters explores how each failed tactic led Kissinger to double down on his lying while becomingly increasingly reckless with military lives and budgetary resources. One of the most compelling elements of the book is Brigham's portrayal of Kissinger's manipulation of an emotionally insecure Nixon. The president often responded by expressing doubts about Kissinger's methods, but he did Kissinger's bidding more often than not out of desperation to win over the American electorate during the 1972 election cycle. As the author methodically chronicles the turmoil inside the U.S. government, his research is especially illuminating about how Kissinger sabotaged the credibility of Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.If readers accept Brigham's evidence, which is considerable, the still-living Kissinger deserves to be disgraced.

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July 23, 2018
Brigham—who teaches U.S. history and international relations at Vassar—offers a persuasive argument that Nixon’s national security adviser (and later secretary of state) Henry Kissinger lied, misled, and deceptively outmaneuvered other policy makers in setting Vietnam War policy from 1969 to 1975, with disastrous results. Drawing on new primary sources from Vietnam and the U.S., Brigham demonstrates that Kissinger and Nixon bungled four years of negotiations with the Vietnamese communists, agreeing to virtually the same peace terms in 1973 that were on the table in 1969. Among other perfidies Brigham cites, Kissinger repeatedly prevented others—including leaders in the State and Defense departments and members of Congress—from making Vietnam War policy. And he lied to Congress and other administration officials about the ongoing peace talks and the military situation in Vietnam. This all-but-total condemnation of Kissinger (and Nixon), while dryly written, confirms what many Kissinger skeptics have believed for decades and may change the minds of some who have believe him to be a foreign policy guru.

August 1, 2018

In this work, Brigham (history, international relations, Vassar Coll.; Iraq, Vietnam, and the Limits of American Power) regards controversial secretary of state Henry Kissinger as arrogant, flawed, and someone whose diplomacy was largely responsible for the Vietnam War's disastrous outcome. Having served as President Richard Nixon's national security advisor and as secretary of state under Nixon and Gerald Ford, the "lone cowboy" shut out Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu, and even Nixon from critical foreign policy decisions. Kissinger's bluster, according to the author, did not intimidate Le Duc Tho, North Vietnam's chief negotiator, however, who never wavered from demanding a unilateral U.S. troop withdrawal. Kissinger is especially faulted for failing to link military actions with political consequences. Although Brigham is not the first to condemn Kissinger's Vietnam diplomacy (see Greg Grandin's Kissinger's Shadow), his conclusions draw from newly released records and archives. VERDICT Vietnam-era scholars and informed audiences fascinated by Kissinger will welcome the author's insights. See also Nial Ferguson's Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist and Jeremi Suri's Henry Kissinger and the American Century for sympathetic appraisals.--Karl Helicher, formerly with Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA

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