Strategic Air Warfare

The purpose of the interview was to have the air commanders meet in an informal setting and discuss the development of strategic air employment as a form of warfare. The hope was that in the course of the discussion these men, who had served together for many years and undergone common experiences, might stimulate each other to remember facts and events that have otherwise gone unrecorded, and to flesh out the record with fuller explanations of motives and the reasoning behind great occurrences. The result was beyond our expectations, for almost immediately the four generals began interviewing each other, reminiscing at times, exchanging ideas, questioning circumstances, and recalling motives and objectives clear at the time of decision but clouded over by the passage of time. Often a single question led to four or five others generated from within the group. At one point when they were discussing atomic warfare and the creation of the Strategic Air Command, General LeMay leaned forward and said quietly to General Johnson, "Let me tell you what I was trying to do...."

The Strategic Air Command was but one of many issues discussed. Beginning with preparations for World War I1 and the concepts underlying planning, training, and equipping American air forces for the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan, the participants explained their roles: in the war in flying and commanding bombing missions and campaigns; in creating the atomic air forces in the immediate postwar years; in building and molding the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s; in advising and making decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis; and in leading and observing the Air Force during the limited war in Southeast Asia.

The Office of Air Force History chose strategic air warfare as the topic because it is a distinctive aspect of air warfare that has molded and defined the United States Air Force since the 1920s. From the writings of Billy Mitchell through the great strategic campaigns of World War I1 to the creation of the nuclear deterrent forces of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, strategic warfare dominated the Air Force, determining the preparations for war, the types of airplanes developed and deployed, and the size and configuration of the service, from the location of its bases to the distinctive decoration on part of its uniforms. The very creation of the Air Force was bound up with the effort to wage independent air war, to use air power against the will and capacity of an enemy nation to wage war in order to decide a conflict without -or independent of- military operations on land or at sea. Thus the Office believed that by exploring the experiences and ideas of some of the senior commanders who led America's strategic air forces in war and peace, it would contribute to an understanding not only of the United States Air Force, but of air power itself. Readers should remember, however, that this interview is not history but the collective memory of four leading airmen; it is the source material upon which history rests. The interview was conducted in person, with the followup discussion completed by telephone two months later. The transcript was edited and partially rearranged to follow a chronological format. Each discussant read and approved the edited transcript, occasionally adding some small fragment of material or editing the text further. The introduction, footnotes, and bibliography were contributed by the editors.